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Abstract—Since the beginning of the century, an increasing
amount of air traffic has pushed current aeronautical communi-
cation systems to their limits. Therefore, a modernization process
is ongoing aiming to digitalize previously analog systems and
prepare them for future requirements. Among these efforts is the
L-Band Digital Aeronautical Communication System (LDACS).
Being the worldwide first integrated Communication, Navigation
and Surveillance (CNS) system, it will replace legacy analog voice
communications in the future. Any newly developed system must
provide strong cyber security, especially when deployed within
critical infrastructures. While previous work has been focused
on implementing Mutual Authentication and Key Establishment
protocols in LDACS, applying security mechanisms in a group
wise fashion has not been evaluated yet. As LDACS control
messages apply to all members of an LDACS cell, Group Key
Management (GKM) methods are a vital step in introducing
control channel security to LDACS. The objective of this paper
is to evaluate GKM procedures to support secure group commu-
nication within LDACS control channels.
Index Terms—LDACS, Cybersecurity, Group Key Manage-
ment, Control Channel Protection, Communication Performance
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2010, 19% of all delays were caused by air traffic control
capacity problems. The European Commission estimated the
ensuing cost for airlines between 1.3 to 1.9 billion euro per
year [9], [36]. One contributing factor is the increased satura-
tion of the Very High Frequency (VHF) band, which serves as
the main communication channel for Air Traffic Management
(ATM). Even with the development of air travel fluctuating
with the global economic situation, long-term trends have
indicated that the passenger demand will further increase [17].
In 2007, the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) has therefore recommended rationalizing the aeronau-
tical communication infrastructure in order to handle future
traffic needs and to implement additional functions [18].
Projects such as Next Generation National Airspace System
(NextGen) in the USA or Single European SKY ATM Re-
search (SESAR) in the EU assist since then in the transition to
digital systems by defining, developing or delivering improved
technologies and procedures [34]. In Europe, one step of this
transition is the development and implementation of the L-
band Digital Aeronautical Communication System (LDACS)
as continental air-to-ground communication standard.
Any newly developed systems must cope with new cyber-
security threats. With the introduction of Software Defined
Radios (SDRs), adversaries can carry out unauthorized inter-
ference with wireless communication more easily. Therefore,
security measures have to be implemented in order to ensure
availability, reliability, integrity and confidentiality of trans-
mitted data.
LDACS is based on a wireless cell structure, with one
Ground Station (GS) connected to multiple Aircraft Station
(AS), thus forming a communication group [21]. In case
the sender wants to reach all group members, it is often
more efficient to transmit one broadcast message instead of
delivering multiple replicas of the same message to each
intended recipient. As at least the integrity of messages should
be guaranteed, a common key has to be shared among the
participants in order to support algorithms such as message
authentication codes. The process of maintaining this shared
secret key is called Group Key Management (GKM).
The objective of this work is to evaluate the applicability
of group key procedures for the protection of LDACS control
channels. We establish a criteria catalogue to select a well-
suited GKM protocol for LDACS among a list of presented
approaches, as well as discuss good approaches for implemen-
tation of GKM within LDACS.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The L-band Digital Aeronautical Communication System
(LDACS)
LDACS is a future aeronautical communication system
aiming to replace current aeronautical continental communica-
tions technologies which are limited in capacity and available
security measures. It is based on technologies from mobile
communication standards such as 4G and has been adapted
for safety critical infrastructure requirements [22].
It provides a cellular structure with point-to-multipoint
connections for Air-To-Ground (A2G) communication. The
ground segment contains several GSs, each controlling an
airspace of up to 200 Nautical Miles (NM) with a maximum
capacity of 512 AS [11]. Aircraft with their respective radio
communication unit (AS1) flying through this area are con-
nected to the same GS via a full duplex radio link. [21]
The LDACS architecture comprises a Physical (PHY),
Medium Access Control (MAC), LDACS Management Entity
(LME), Data Link Service (DLS), Voice Interface (VI) as well
as a Sub-Network Protocol (SNP) layer.
The physical layer is responsible for the transmission of data
over the radio channel. Depending on the sending direction, it
is being distinguished between Forward Link (FL) for ground-
to-air and Reverse Link (RL) for air-to-ground transmission.
Both links are separated by Frequency Division Duplex (FDD)
[9], the FL transmits on a 1110 - 1156 MHz frequency range
while the RL is located at 964 - 1010 MHz [11], [21].
In order to enable a GS to provide bi-directional links to
multiple AS within its cell, different AS are separated on the
RL in time (via Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA))
as well as in frequency (via Orthogonal Frequency Division
Multiple Access (OFDMA)). While the GS is transmitting
a continuous stream of data, every AS has to request its
respective resources on the RL. This can happen on-demand,
but also permanently reoccurring resources can be requested.
Each AS has therefore a defined sending time-slot making
all RL transmission scheduled and deterministic. The only
exception are Random Access (RA) messages transmitted by
the AS during the cell-entry procedure [9].
Communication with the PHY layer is achieved via the
MAC sub-layer, which forms the lower half of the Data
Link Layer (DLL). It consists of the MAC entity, which is
providing means for physical access to higher layers as shown
in Figure 1. As these components have no information about
the physical layer or the methods of transmission, they are only
communicating with another utilizing logical channels [9]. The
MAC unit is mapping those logical channels between the peer
DLL entities onto resources of the physical layer [11].
Fig. 1: LDACS protocol stack [9]. The Airborne Voice In-
terface (AVI), Airborne Network Interface (ANI) as well as
Voice Gateway (VG) and Access-Router (AC-R) are external,
higher level services LDACS can be connected to.
1Within the scope of this paper, the terms aircraft and Aircraft Station (AS)
are used interchangeably
Parallel to the VI and DLS, the LME is located on the
stack. The GS LME is responsible for link maintenance and
managing the cell-entry (join) and cell-exit (leave) of AS.
Therefore, it is also of special interest for this paper, as any
GKM protocols would be implemented in it. Additionally, the
GS LME manages the resource allocation on the forward and
reverse link as well.
The logical channels used for communication among the
peer DLL entities of the AS and GS can be divided into control
and user data plane channels. While the latter one consists
of the Data Channel (DCH) only, the control plane comprises
four different channels. The Random Access Channel (RACH)
and Dedicated Control Channel (DCCH) are located on the
Reverse Link, while the Forward Link entails the Broadcast
Control Channel (BCCH) and Common Control Channel
(CCCH).
Information required for registration is being transmitted by
the GS in the BCCH to all new aircraft. The counterpart to
this channel is the RACH in the RL, which enables up to
two aircraft within the same frame segment to transmit an
unscheduled cell-entry request. Having successfully entered
the LDACS cell, further control messages of the LME are
transferred utilizing the CCCH or DCCH respectively [11].
While assignment of transmission slots on the ground-to-air
link can be processed locally within the GS, each AS LME
has to request the required resources at its GS counterpart.
Hereby, the DCCH is being used for the requests, while the
resource allocation messages are being transmitted by the GS
via the CCCH. [9]
When payload data is being transferred, it is exchanged
between the local MAC sub-layer and the Physical Layer
(PHY) in form of a FL or RL Physical Layer Service Data
Unit (PHY-SDU). Before being sent over the air, the data is
going through a process of coding and modulation, creating a
stream of modulated symbols. Mapping those symbols to FL
or RL is carried out in blocks, which are called Physical Layer


































































Fig. 2: Frame structure of LDACS [11]
Therefore, one PHY-PDU contains the data of one
PHY-SDU, and has a variable size which depends on the
Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM) frame
type and the used coding and modulation [11]. With improving
channel quality the coding and modulation of the individual
PHY-SDU packets can be adjusted to provide a higher data
rate. Please note, LDACS always encodes control data with
the most robust coding and modulation [21].
Data transfer heavily depends on LDACS’ frame structure
depicted in Figure 2. FL and RL are based on the transmission
of hierarchically structured Super Frames (SFs), each 240 ms
long. Every SF starts with a general access slot of 6.72 ms
in length, followed by four consecutive Multi Frame (MF)
spanning 58.32 ms each [24]. The individual structure of the
general access and MFs differ between the forward and reverse
link. However, any MF consist of a data and control channel
slot, which are in turn constructed of individual PHY-PDUs.
In the FL, the Common Control (CC) slot is controlled by
the GS, can span up to eight PHY-PDUs, each containing 728
b and therefore providing a maximum size of 5,824 b. PHY-
PDUs in the RL are assigned per AS, have a size of 83 b, and
each Dedicated Control (DC) PHY-PDU is controlled by the
AS, the GS assigned it to.
B. Group Key Management (GKM)
In general, the process of maintaining and distributing the
required keys for re-keying and encryption to several clients
can be summarized under the term Group Key Management
(GKM) [6].
All participants in the communication group are sharing a
common encryption key, known as Group Key (GK), Traffic
Encryption Key (TEK) or Group TEK (GTEK), which is used
for the underlying algorithm. Depending on the protocol, a
key to encrypt the GK for transmission, the Key Encryption
Key (KEK) or Group KEK (GKEK) is required.
The difficulty of sending data securely within a communica-
tion group has consequently been shifted to the challenge of
establishing and distributing such group keys among autho-
rized participants of the communication in a secure manner
[19]. Nevertheless, most protocols are based on pairwise ex-
changed keys between the group controller and each member.
III. METHOD
The individual LDACS control channels have different char-
acteristics and therefore show varying possibilities to apply
GKM protocols.
The BCCH as well as the RACH are both intended for
handling aircraft which are not part of the GS managed cell
yet. Consequently, no shared secrets have been exchanged
between the GS and the aircraft at this point, making group
key procedures impractical.
CCCH and DCCH are vital to the LDACS operation as
they do not only provide the means necessary for resource
allocation on the data channel but also transmit keep-alive,
link management and configuration messages. Tampering with
data transmitted on these control channels would render the
system unusable, as e.g., no resource allocation would be
possible anymore. Depending on the message type, they are
either directed to a single AS or broadcast as they contain
information important to all members of the group (e.g. CC
slot descriptor). Therefore, the applicability of group key
procedures to protect the CCCH and DCCH is investigated
further. A threat assessment serves as a foundation to deter-
mine the required measures needed to secure the channels
appropriately.
A. Risk Analysis of Control Channels
In order to evaluate the individual security requirements of
the control channels, the basic security goals of the CIA triad
(Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) are being used as a ref-
erence to identify critical areas [33]. Furthermore, additional
features such as authenticity, non-repudiation, accountability
and reliability are considered as well.
The definitions contained in RFC 4949 [35] aim to support
the creation of material within the Internet standards process.
Therefore they are used to outline the scope of the individual
terms used in this paper as well. Table I resembles an overview
of the single elements as well as an assessment of the necessity
to be considered for LDACS’ CC/DC channels.
During the analysis, the key security characteristics needed
for a stable LDACS operation have been identified as avail-
ability/reliability, authenticity and integrity. If e.g., the latter
one is absent, an attacker could affect the resource allocation
process by injecting false messages or altering existing ones.
By advising all aircraft to transmit in the same time-slot
and thereby interfering with another, the entire system could
become inaccessible.
While availability and reliability are considered important
control channel security characteristics, physical attacks such
as jamming can hardly be prevented by protocol design.
However, by implementing cryptographic means such as ac-
cess credentials or signatures, resources can be kept available
to legitimate users by preventing processing of malicious
messages. Therefore, measures for integrity and authenticity
protection indirectly also contribute to an available and reliable
control channel.
Confidentiality of transmitted control messages has not been
identified as a required security measure, which is based on
the nature of the transmitted information.
B. Securing LDACS CCCH/DCCH Control Channels
The required security characteristics can be achieved by
various methods and on different levels within LDACS. How-
ever, as performance parameters such as latency and available
bandwidth should be affected as little as possible, certain
restrictions apply.
Digital Signatures:
A very common cryptographic method to verify the origin
and integrity of a message are digital signatures. In order
to achieve a security comparable to symmetric cryptography
algorithms, public key algorithms require longer operands
and therefore are up to 2-3 times slower than symmetric
algorithms. [27]
TABLE I: Overview of different security goals, the associated threats and applicability to LDACS
Security Value Definition [35] Threats required
Availability The property of a system or a system resource
being accessible, or usable or operational upon
demand, by an authorized system entity, ac-
cording to performance specifications for the
system; i.e., a system is available if it provides
services according to the system design when-
ever a user requests it.
When the e.g., CCCH Channel is not available,
the GS is unable to assign resources anymore
and the system’s functionality is lost. An attack
scenario could be jamming the channel.
yes
Authenticity The property of being genuine and able to be
verified and be trusted.
If the origin of messages cannot be validated,
unauthorized messages can be injected into the
system or an authorized user can be imperson-
ated. An attacker could e.g., send false allo-
cation messages to schedule all aircraft onto
the same time-slot, creating a blockage of the
individual signals and impairing system perfor-
mance and usability.
yes
Integrity The property that information has not been
modified or destroyed in an unauthorized man-
ner.
Unauthorized message alteration (e.g., by delay,
modification or re-ordering) can create the same
disruption of service as missing authenticity.
yes
Confidentiality The property that data is not disclosed to system
entities unless they have been authorized to
know the data.
With no confidentiality protection in place,
unauthorized user can gain information via e.g.
eavesdropping. However, analyzing the content
of control messages have shown little confi-
dential information included in such. Confi-
dentiality protection is therefore not considered
necessary.
no
Non-Repudiation A security service that provides protection
against false denial of involvement in an asso-
ciation (especially a communication association
that transfers data).
It is assumed, that AS within the cell have
authenticated to the ground infrastructure prior,
hence are considered as trustworthy and only
send messages they are authorized to. Imper-
sonation of e.g., the ground station, by an AS
is therefore not seen as probable.
no
Accountability The property of a system or system resource that
ensures that the actions of a system entity may
be traced uniquely to that entity, which can then
be held responsible for its actions.
Similar to Non-Repudiation it can be assumed
that users authorized to participate in the
LDACS cell are trustworthy.
no
Reliability The ability of a system to perform a required
function under stated conditions for a specified
period of time.
As the system is not functional without its
control channels, their reliability is important as
well.
yes
Furthermore, the resulting signature sizes are not negligible
as well. While achieving a 128 b security level, e.g. RSA-
3072 requires a 3072 b long key and computes a 3072 b long
signature. Algorithms based on elliptic curves, e.g. ECDSA,
work with 256 b long keys and are able to reduce the signature
size down to 520 b. Further advances in the quantum attack
resistant algorithms, such as GeMMS 128, allow for signatures
with only 258 b in length, however require public keys with
352.19 KB in size which are several magnitudes larger than
conventional public keys [5].
As this information needs to be distributed to the AS and
GS as well, the large signature and/or public key sizes make an
application for LDACS’ small control channels impracticable.
Message Authentication Codes (MACs):
While Message Authentication Codes also provide authen-
ticity and integrity of data, they are based on symmetric
cryptography and therefore require the recipient and sender
to share a secret key before any transmission can be protected
[27]. In digital aeronautical communications security, MACs
are used for instance in the ACARS Message Security (AMS)
system [2], [3]. Due to the short message sizes and low
throughput of the initial Aircraft Communications Addressing
and Reporting System (ACARS) (2.4 kbps) [1], with updates
of ACARS via VHF Digital Link Mode 2 (VDLm2) (31.5
kbps) in the 90’s [31], the length of used MACs in AMS is
truncated to 32 b [3]. The probability of an attacker guessing
the correct MAC being 1232 combined with the short validity
of the key of maximum one flight, the usage of such shortened
MACs has been evaluated as being sufficient [3].
Similar considerations are applicable within LDACS. As all
CC/DC transmissions are deterministic, bruteforcing MACs is
limited to the specific time slots in which CCCH/DCCH are
sent, reducing the probabilities of a successful attack.
Therefore, due to higher efficiency by smaller message
overheads, fewer required memory and faster execution, the
use of MACs over digital signatures is desirable.
Security Overhead:
In the following, the bits created by MACs in relation to the
secured message will be summarized under the term security
overhead. With a constant sized MAC, the relation between
the two values is inversely proportional.
Therefore, the overhead depends on the level MACs are
utilized on, which in turn is affected by characteristics of
LDACS. When recalling the exact layout of the LDACS frame
structure from Figure 2, it can be seen that the CCCH is shifted
in time by approximately half a MF duration in respect to the
Fig. 3: Shift between control channels in the FL and RL.
DCCH. This enables an alternating use of both channels, i.e.
messages sent in the DCCH can be answered in the CCCH
following approximately 30 ms later and vise versa as shown
in Figure 3. Latency is reduced by one MF per round trip,
while the minimal timely distance of 15.12 ms between the
end of a full CC slot and the next DC slot has to be observed
and serves as the maximum time any verification process
might take. Preserving this alternating control slot use can be
achieved by selecting an optimal level for MAC deployment.
The smallest entity, security can be applied to, are the control
messages themselves. Processing can start with the reception
of the message and therefore not influence the system’s latency
significantly. With control message sizes varying between 16
to 96 b [11], even small MACs create a high security overhead
and reduce the available bandwidth significantly. While this
approach would allow a use of pairwise keys between GS
and AS for individual messages, broadcasts still require a
common shared secret in order to avoid multiple transmissions.
Reducing the security overhead can be achieved by applying
MACs to larger data packets. As the control channels consists
of blocks, each PHY-PDU can be protected, benefiting the
CCCH with its comparably large 728 b long unit the most.
Similar to protecting individual messages, latency would not
be impaired noticeably. Due to multiple AS transmitting during
one DC slot, the PHY-PDU with its 83 b is the largest entity
which can be protected in the RL. However, as the GS is the
only intended recipient of such messages, pairwise exchanged
keys can be used for MAC calculation, provided the GS is
capable of having all required keys in store or load them in
the respective timely manner. As the GS is the only entity
transmitting in the FL, MACs could also be applied to an
entire CCCH slot. While reducing the security overhead, re-
transmission of the entire slot is necessary if any of the PHY-
PDUs has not been received correctly. Further reduction can
be achieved by protecting an entire FL MF, which requires its
complete reception prior to its verification. The subsequent
calculations then take place while the next DCCH slot is
already ongoing, limiting the alternating control channel use.
As the data channel within a MF might contain individually
protected data, applying a common security is impractical as
well.
In conclusion: to allow any AS to read and verify infor-
mation within the CCCH, applying MACs for cryptographic
integrity and authenticity checks on individual PHY-PDUs is
the most suited solution. Due to the underlying symmetric
cryptography, the required shared secret within a LDACS cell
calls for a GKM, responsible for establishing and maintaining
such keys. However, most GKM protocols require all members
to have a pairwise shared secret with the group controller.
Within LDACS it is foreseen, that an individual aircraft will
share a secret with the GS, established in a previous Mutual
Authentication and Key Exchange (MAKE) protocol executed
during the cell entry process. A Key Derivation Function
(KDF) will be used to derive a key used for protecting individ-
ual communications between the AS and GS. As information
sent by one AS in its assigned time slot is only addressed to
the GS, the derived, shared key can be used for securing the
DCCH as well. While the theoretical considerations support
the choice of MACs for security, it has to be evaluated if
the bandwidth constraint environment holds enough additional
capacity for the security data.
Concept for Securing the CC/DC Channel:
To find out CCCH, as well as DCCH allocations, dif-
ferent data throughput ∈ {1, 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300}
kbps were simulated for different amount of AS ∈
{1, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 512} in an LDACS cell with the
Framework for Aeronautical Communications and Traffic Sim-
ulations 2 (FACTS2) [12].
LDACS Coding and Modulation Scheme (CMS) is set
to one, representing the most robust CMS scheme of
LDACS. With that the highest throughput, LDACS can
handle is 315 kbps in the FL and 280 kbps in the
RL [11], [25]. The chosen throughput covers that range.
To test for higher datarates, an additional run with
CMS=8 was performed with a data throughput range of
{1, 200, 400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400} kbps. At CMS=8,
LDACS can handle 1428 kbps in the FL and 1390 kbps in
the RL. For all test scenarios, realistic data traffic patterns
[10] were used, with 74% small packets with 125 B and 26%
large packets with 1400 B in the FL and 80% small packets
with 125 B and 20% large packets with 1400 B in the RL.
Figure 4 shows the allocation of CC data per CC PHY-
PDU in the 99-percentile (i.e., P99%) at two different LDACS
CMS (i.e., 1 and 8). Over all simulation results, only two
occurrences with over 640 b per CC PHY-PDU are observed.
640 b marks the boundary for which 128 b MACs per CC
PHY-PDU would not be possible anymore. Observing the DC
allocations revealed, that with increasing amount of AS, small
DC allocations in the range of 12-32 b increase, while with
growing data rates, more, larger DC allocations in the range
of 64-82 b are observed. Comparing both simulated CMS
reveals, at 1 AS, 200 kbps, CMS=1, the mean is at 64.40 b,
the P99% at 78 b, while at the same number of AS and data
rate but CMS=8, the mean was at 62.50 b and P99% at 78 b.
Increasing the amount of aircraft to 100, taking the same data
rate and comparing the two CMS reveals 16.23 b mean and
42 b P99% at CMS=1 and 14.97 b mean and 42 b P99%
at CMS=8. These examples demonstrate the aforementioned
observation of many small DC allocations at a high number of
AS and many large DC allocations at a low numbers of AS,








(b) P99% CC PHY-PDU allocation @CMS=8
Fig. 4: P99% CC allocations per CC PHY-PDU (c.f. total size of 728 b)
forward for LDACS control channel security becomes clear:
• CCCH security - Figure 4 shows the CCCH to have
enough capacity left to add a 32/64/96 b truncated or
even full 128b MAC for each CC PHY-PDU. To calculate
and verify that MAC, the TEK will be used, as every
aircraft in the cell need to be able to verify the integrity
and authenticity of the CC. Another option is replacing
the current Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) attached
to each CC message with a combined CRC plus MAC
approach [7], calculated over an entire CC PHY-PDU data
block. As there are approximately 20 CC messages in
one CC PHY-PDU data block (i.e., with 35 b average
CC message size: 728 b/35 b = 20.8) [11], this approach
saves 20.8×8 b = 166.4 b, enabling the space to use one
128 b combined CRC and MAC per CC PHY-PDU data
block.
• DCCH security - The explanations above reveal the
DCCH to not have enough capacity left to add a MAC of
any size (i.e., 16/32/64/96/128 b). Therefore the only way
to ensure data protection is to use the individual, shared
keys between AS and GS, negotiated during the initial
MAKE protocol of LDACS [23], [26], and to encrypt the
DC payload with an algorithm negotiated in the MAKE
procedure. As the DC size is 83 b, a stream cipher, like
ChaCha20 is required for that [29].
To summarize: GKM are only considered for the protection
of the CCCH.
C. Evaluation Criteria of Group Key Management procedures
Overall the following criteria have been identified to eval-
uate a GKM procedure for suitability for LDACS.
• Network overhead: All messages needed for the operation
of the GKM protocol are summarized in this section
as they influence the required bandwidth. However, the
length of an encrypted re-keying message greatly depends
on the used algorithm and the number of plain text bits.
Therefore, a minimum implementation is assumed, with
the message length equal to the size of the plain text.
• Computational overhead: This category describes the
required calculations needed for e.g., re-keying message
encryption. O-Notation is used to qualify the complexity
of the operation, as actual execution speed and delay
vary with the underlying hardware. A distinction between
different types of mathematical operations is made.
• Storage overhead: Each key used in the GKM procedure
has to be stored with the respective entity. This category
analyzes the total storage costs, while distinguishing
between a Group Member (GM) and the Group Controller
(GC).
D. Selection of Group Key Management procedures
Throughout this paper only Centralized Group Key Man-
agement procedures are regarded to reflect the LDACS use
case. In this approach one entity is responsible for controlling
the whole group and distributing the TEK to the members
[19]. The complexity and trust is put into a single system,
which can be handled by either a GC or Key Server (KS)
[38]. Commonly used protocols such as Kerberos are based
on centralized systems as well. With increasing group sizes
or geographical distribution, central management with its
associated operations might become difficult, though. [8] In
the next section we will compare and evaluate the suitability of
Group Key Management Procedure (GKMP) [13], [14], Logi-
cal Key Hierachy (LKH) [30], One-way Function Tree (OFT)
[41], Centralized Flate Table Key Management (CFKM) [39],
Chinese Remaindering Group Key (CRGK) [42], CRT-GKM
[38] and Central Authorized Key Extension (CAKE) [15] for
LDACS.
IV. RESULTS
A. Theoretical Evaluation of Network, Computational and
Storage Overheads of selected GKM
The previously described metrics are summarized for each
named protocol or cryptographic scheme in Table II. Rather
TABLE II: Comparison of different GKM procedures under the proposed evaluation criteria
Protocol Network Overhead (in bit) Computational Overhead Storage Overhead
GKMP [13] Join:
Broadcast: 2× k
Unicast: 2× k + k
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GC: n+ (1 + 3k)
Group Member: (2 + k) + 1
than focusing on the individual message numbers in the
network overhead, the total amount of bits required to be
transmitted for each group operation is evaluated. In order to
compare different computational overheads, required complex-
ities to compute a XOR (OX ), to encrypt/decrypt keys (OK),
to create/solve a CRT system (OC) as well as for modulo
operations (OM ) or any combination of such are used.
B. LDACS Centered Evaluation of GKM Procedures
When applying GKM procedures within LDACS, not all
mentioned criteria are valued equally within the evaluation
process. As LDACS will be deployed primarily in commercial
aircraft with engine driven electrical generators [32] and
custom made hardware, it can be assumed that the operating
environment of LDACS is neither power nor computational
restricted. Required storage capacities can be provided easily
within the hardware design as well, but limitations due to e.g.
the use of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) might apply.
With bandwidth being very restricted within the LDACS
system, it is a critical category for the evaluation. As additional
latency imposed by the GKM protocol on the communication
is also influenced by the amount of bits needed to be trans-
ferred, the network overhead is the main focus for further
comparison of the proposed protocols. Computational as well
as storage overhead play a subordinate role.
While Table II gives a mathematical explanation of the
required bits to be transmitted, the comparison can be visu-
alized more easily by using a sample computation among the
different algorithms. As the network overhead is depending
on the number of users n in each of the described protocols,
the largest number of bits can be seen when looking at a full
LDACS cell. Therefore, Table III represents the individual bits
assuming the maximum amount of users, 512, as well as an
underlying key size of 128 b for each different application
(individual user key, KEKs and TEKs).
V. EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
All analyzed GKM protocols rely on the transmission of
broadcast messages. Without creating additional traffic by
utilizing acknowledgement messages, finding a way to reliably
send broadcasts is a key requirement for any GKM implemen-
tation.
TABLE III: Sample calculation of network overhead in bit for different GKM protocols
Protocol Join Operation (Cell Entry) Leave Operation (Cell Exit)
GKMP Broadcast: 2× 128 b = 256 b
Unicast: 2× 128 b+ 128 b = 384 b
(n− 1)× (2× 128b) = 511× 256 b = 130, 816 b
LKH Broadcast: 2log2(512)× 128 b = 2, 304 b
Unicast: 128 b
(2log2(512)− 1)× 128b = 2, 176 b
OFT Broadcast: log2(512)× 128 b = 1, 152 b
Unicast: log2(512)× 128 b+ 128 b = 1, 280 b
log2(512)× 128 b = 1, 152 b
CFKM Broadcast: 2× 24× 128 b = 6, 144 b
Unicast: 24× 128 b+ 128 b = 3, 200 b
2× 24× 128 b = 6, 144 b
CRGK Broadcast: CRT (512) ≈ 69, 120 b2
Unicast: 136 b
CRT (511) ≈ 68, 985 b
CRT-GKM Broadcast: CRT (512) ≈ 69, 120 b
Unicast: 136 b
CRT (511) ≈ 68, 985 b
CAKE Broadcast: 2× 128 b = 256 b
Unicast: 2× 128 b+ 128 b+ 136 b = 408 b
CRT (log3(n2)) + k + (log3(n)− 1)× |CRT (3)| =
3, 936 + 128 + 4, 960 b = 9, 024 b
Tables II and III from the previous sections have listed the
corresponding message bits for a user join and leave operation.
As each AS has to enter the cell and cannot remain indefinitely
within, the total amount of network overhead per AS can be
seen as the sum of bits required to be sent for both operations.
Figure 5 visualizes the different amount of bits needed for
each protocol’s join and leave operation. Hereby, a logarithmic
scale has been used in order to accommodate protocols such
as OFT and CRGK reasonably within the same graphic.













Fig. 5: Visualization of Table III by using a logarithmic scale
on the y-axis to display the bit amount. OFT can be identified
as the protocol with the least bits required, especially within
the leave process.
Even though Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) based
protocols generally require only one message to be transmitted,
the underlying cryptographic calculations lead to a greatly
increased message size as explained in Table III. Therefore,
2The solution of the CRT congruence system is unique modulo the
product of the individual primes [4]. When using a prime length of 136 b,
as suggested in [16], and assuming an average value being half of the
maximum, it corresponds to a length of 135 b. With 512 AS within a cell,
(2135)512 = 2135×512 = 269120 corresponds to a length of 69,120 b as
the maximum value of the unique solution of the system. This formula is the
basis for all CRT (x) calculations within CRGK and CRT-GKM.
the implementation of this algorithm is not practical for the
LDACS use case.
While CAKE utilizes a 3-ary LKH in order to reduce the
required network overhead for group leave operations, the CRT
algorithm is applied as well. Similar to CRGK, the message
size can still be considered too large for the LDACS control
channel use case, considering especially the CRT based tree
operation in the leave process.
The simple GKMP uses smaller individual messages sizes,
each being the length of the used keys, however requires
the transmission in a one-to-one fashion for group leave
operations.
Due to the number of bits of the identifier used in LDACS,
the CFKM protocol is showing results greater than CAKE and
can be excluded for further considerations as well.
Compared to previous protocols, the proposed tree key
hierarchy approaches manage to reduce the number of keys
needed to be updated notably. While additional bits needed for
e.g., message header information, have not been considered in
Table II or Table III, they can be kept to a minimum when all
group members have knowledge of the general tree structure.
With a full LDACS cell containing 512 users, a full binary
tree structure would only require 9 KEKs to be updated.
While LKH encrypts every new KEK with each of its sibling’s
keys, OFT further reduces the transferred bits by establishing
a functional dependency among the KEKs. This reduction
in message size however requires, that each joining user is
receiving the blended keys for its ancestor sibling set in a
unicast fashion. Thus, the benefit from OFT becomes more
visible in case of a member leaving the group. As both
operations happen within the group equally, OFT can save
log2(n)× key-length bit per AS compared to LKH.
The goal for the chosen GKM protocol is to keep the
network overhead as minimal as possible. As shown in Table II
and III, OFT meets these requirements among the described
protocols best.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work has analyzed the characteristics and security
requirements of the control channels of LDACS for the appli-
cation of GKM procedures, proposed an area of application,
a suitable algorithm and a point for implementation.
We have provided a comprehensive overview of the LDACS
system and gave an introduction to GKM.
An assessment of the control channel security requirements
resulted in integrity and authenticity being the main security
characteristics for the CCCH/DCCH. While those properties
can be achieved in different ways, a short MAC has been
suggested due to a prevailing restricted bandwidth within the
channels. We identified the CCCH as suitable to be protected
via short MACs and a group key derived from the GKM
procedure, as every aircraft needs to be able to read and verify
all CC message sent by the ground-station. This approach is
not viable for the DCCH, due to limited space and all aircraft
contributing individually to the DCCH. However, information
transmitted within the DCCH are intended for the GS only
and can therefore use pairwise exchanged keys for protection
which are not managed by the GKM protocol.
The symmetrical key establishment for the protection of
the CCCH can be achieved via GKM protocols, from which
the OFT is considered the most suitable due the minimum
amount of bits needed for its operation among all other listed
protocols.
Future work will comprise the incorporation of the proposed
GKM protocol into the existing LDACS security architecture.
This also includes the integration of a reliable broadcast,
required by most GKM protocols.
APPENDIX
A2G Air-To-Ground
ACARS Aircraft Communications Addressing and
Reporting System
AC-R Access-Router
AMS ACARS Message Security
ANI Airborne Network Interface
AS Aircraft Station
ATM Air Traffic Management
AVI Airborne Voice Interface
BCCH Broadcast Control Channel
CAKE Central Authorized Key Extension
CC Common Control
CCCH Common Control Channel
CFKM Centralized Flate Table Key Management
CMS Coding and Modulation Scheme
CRGK Chinese Remaindering Group Key
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CRT Chinese Remainder Theorem
DC Dedicated Control
DCCH Dedicated Control Channel
DCH Data Channel
DLL Data Link Layer
DLS Data Link Service
FACTS2 Framework for Aeronautical Communications
and Traffic Simulations 2





GKM Group Key Management




ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
KDF Key Derivation Function
KEK Key Encryption Key
KS Key Server
LDACS L-band Digital Aeronautical Communication
System
LKH Logical Key Hierachy
LME LDACS Management Entity
MAC Medium Access Control
MAKE Mutual Authentication and Key Exchange
MF Multi Frame
NM Nautical Miles
OFDM Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing
OFT One-way Function Tree
PHY Physical Layer
PHY-PDU Physical Layer Protocol Data Unit
PHY-SDU Physical Layer Service Data Unit
RACH Random Access Channel
RL Reverse Link
SDR Software Defined Radio
SF Super Frame
SNP Sub-Network Protocol
TEK Traffic Encryption Key
TPM Trusted Platform Module
VDLm2 VHF Digital Link Mode 2
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[7] E. Dubrova, M. Näslund, G. Selander, and F. Lindqvist, “Message au-
thentication based on cryptographically secure CRC without polynomial
irreducibility test,” Cryptography and Communications, vol. 10, no. 2,
pp. 383–399, 2018.
[8] N. Felde, T. Guggemos, T. Heider, and D. Kranzlmüller, “Secure group
key distribution in constrained environments with IKEv2,” in 2017 IEEE
Conference on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2017, pp. 384–391.
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[23] Mäurer, N. and Bilzhause, A., “A Cybersecurity Architecture for the L-
band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS),” in 37th
Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC). London, UK: IEEE,
September 2018, pp. 1–10.
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